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When does a nonimmigrant alien establish a United States dom-
icile and thus, a residence subjecting him to estate and gift tax?
The authors find that the case law, in both the tax and immigra-
tion fields, gives only a partial answer to that question, identifying
only the G-4 visa holder as capable of establishing a domicile.
They recommend that regulation be promulgated to delineate
whether and under what circumstances each category of nonimmi-
grant aliens may, if at all, establish a United States domicile.
INTRODUCTION
Can a nonimmigrant alien1 or an undocumented2 alien legally es-
* Member of the New York Bar. B.A., Yeshiva University, 1954; J.D., New York
University School of Law, 1957; LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1959. Mr.
Wildes is a member of the firm of Wildes & Weinberg and is a Director and Past Presi-
dent of the American Immigration Lawyers Association and Adjunct Professor of Law at
the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. He is a frequent contrib-
utor to the SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW.
** Member of the New York Bar. B.A., Brooklyn College, 1973; J.D., New York
University School of Law, 1977; LL.M. (Taxation), New York University School of
Law, 1983. Mr. Grunblatt is an associate of the firm of Wildes & Weinberg and a
member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association.
Grateful appreciation is expressed by the authors to Ms. Roxanne Levine, a student at
Touro Law School, for her research assistance in preparing this article.
1. All aliens seeking admission to the United States are presumed to be immi-
grants and are so classified with the exception of those classes enunciated in section
101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1982).
2. The term "undocumented" alien is used to describe aliens who are in the United
States, but not within authorization of the law.
December 1983 Vol. 21 No. 1
tablish a "domicile" s in the United States? The answer to this ques-
tion may affect the interpretation given to section 212(c) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (INA)." Section 212(c) permits a
waiver of excludability for aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence who temporarily proceed abroad5 and who are returning to
a "lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years."
The interpretation and applicability of section 212(c) are also im-
portant to aliens because they are subject to United States gift and
estate taxation if they are "domiciled" in the United States. Section
212(c) is also important in determining whether a nonresident alien
can establish the necessary domicile7 to be subject to United States
estate and gift tax jurisdiction on all property owned worldwide.8
This article explores the statutory and case law relating to "domi-
cile" and visa classification for aliens who are not permanent resi-
dents or immigrants to the United States. This review establishes the
criteria for determining whether, or under what circumstances, an
alien may be legally able to establish domicile for purposes of estate
and gift taxation.9
BACKGROUND
Domicile and the Estate and Gift Tax
An individual is a United States resident for estate and gift tax
purposes if he has his domicile in the United States.10 Generally, "A
person acquires a domicile in a place by living there, for even a brief
period of time, with no definite present intention of later removing
therefrom. Residence without the requisite intention to remain indef-
initely will not suffice to constitute domicile . . ."I One who has
established such domicile and is therefore a resident alien is taxable
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (1971) provides a general
definition of domicile as follows:
(1) Domicil is a place, usually a person's home, to which the Rules of Conflicts
of Laws sometimes accord determinative significance because of the per-
son's identification with that place
(2) Every person has a domicil at all times and at least for the same purpose,
no person has more than one domicil at a time.
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1982).
5. But see Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 48-52).
6. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1982).
7. A resident for estate tax purposes is a person who, at the time of his death, had
his domicile in the United States. Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(b) (1983). Similarly, a resident
for gift tax purposes is one who, at the date of the gift, had his domicile in the United
States. Treas. Reg. § 25.2501-1(b) (1983).
8. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(a) (1983); Treas. Reg. § 25.2501-1(a)(1) (1983).
9. One may alternatively characterize this analysis as an exploration of the viabil-
ity of the "legal disability" doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 17-25.
10. Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(b) (1983); Treas. Reg. § 25.2501-1(b) (1983).
11. Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(b)(1) (1983).
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on his worldwide estate1 2 at the same rates as United States
citizens. 13
A nonresident alien's liability for gift and estate taxes14 is limited
to property situated in the United States."5 Thus, the possession or
lack of a United States domicile may have very significant tax conse-
quences to the individual."
The "Legal Disability Doctrine"-The Original Principle
In Revenue Ruling 74-364,'7 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
ruled that a French citizen admitted to the United States on a G-4
visa was not domiciled in the United States even though he resided
here and intended to reside here permanently.18 The ruling con-
cluded that the terms of the decedent's stay in the United States as
limited pursuant to section 101 of the INA19 "created a legal disa-
bility that rendered him incapable of forming the intention necessary
for the establishment of a domicile here."'2° The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws also enunciates the principle that a domicile
of choice may be acquired only by a person who is legally capable of
12. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(a) (1983); Treas. Reg. § 25.2501-1(a)(1) (1983).
13. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2001-1(a) (1983) (the gross estate tax computation is
made irrespective of citizenship).
14. Treas. Reg. § 20.2101-1 (1983); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-3 (1983).
15. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2103-1 (1983); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(b) (1983).
16. The following hypothetical illustrates the significance and consequences of non-
residence and residence status for purposes of the estate and gift tax: "X," a nonresident
for estate and gift tax purposes, in anticipation of becoming a resident, transfers intangi-
ble property such as money, securities, and tangible property located abroad to an irrevo-
cable trust whose beneficiaries include his children and himself. Such transfer in trust
should not be subject to the United States gift tax since a gift of intangible property or
tangible properties situated outside the United States by a nonresident alien is not a
taxable gift. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2501-1(a)(2), .2511(a) (1983). Furthermore, the property
will not be subject to estate tax on the death of "X," even if he is a United States
domiciliary at the time of his death since he is not an owner of the trust property at the
time of his death, and the original gift was not attached to a gift for United States tax
purposes. Treas. Reg. § 20.2101 (1983).
If "X" were a resident of the United States for gift and estate tax purposes at the time
of this transaction, the transfer to the trust would be subject to the gift tax and the value
of the gift property at the time of the gift would also be subject to the estate tax at his
death.
17. Rev. Rul. 364, 1974-2 C.B. 321 (revoked by Rev. Rul. 363, 1980-2 C.B. 249).
18. Although it is not specifically stated, Revenue Ruling 74-364 would be applica-
ble where the individual subjectively intended to reside here permanently, that implica-
tion is clear from the subsequent ruling, Rev. Rul. 363, 1980-2 C.B. 249, which, in re-
versing the previous ruling, makes reference to a hypothetical involving subjective intent
to remain in the United States permanently.
19. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15) (1982).
20. Rev. Rul. 364, 1974-2 C.B. 321, 322.
changing his or her domicile. 1 In other words, there must be a legal
capacity to acquire such domicile.22
The IRS was not breaking new ground in adopting this principle
but was accepting what the Restatement portrays as a settled matter
of law with clear applicability in the tax area. The IRS referred to
Seren v. Douglas,23 which considered whether a nonimmigrant alien
student can be a domiciliary of Colorado:
We agree that the federal statutes in question did create a legal disability
which would render Seren incapable of forming the intent required by state
statute so long as he, in compliance with federal law, was here on a legal
basis which bound him to not abandon his homeland.14
The Revenue Ruling also cites In re Gaffney's Estate,15 which ap-
plied the legal disability doctrine. The court held that a nonimmi-
grant alien could not be "an inhabitant" of New York so as to qual-
ify as an administrator under local law. Although it is unclear
whether the term "inhabitant" has a meaning interchangeable with
"domicile," the IRS appears to accept that the legal disability doc-
trine is applicable.
Elkins & Lok. The Law Develops
After Revenue Ruling 74-364, rules of domicile and residence for
estate tax purposes and the visa classification system mandated by
the INA appeared to be in balance and harmony. A nonimmigrant,
nonresident alien would be legally disabled from establishing domi-
cile in the United States, regardless of his nonimmigrant visa classi-
fication, 26 but a resident alien would have no such restriction.
This harmony and symmetry was soon disrupted by two separate
developments in the case law: the United States Supreme Court de-
cision in Elkins v. Moreno,2 7 and the series of cases interpreting sec-
tion 212(c) of the INA28 commencing with Francis v. INS29 and
culminating in the Lok decisions.30
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 15(1) (1971).
22. Id.
23. 30 Colo. App. 110, 489 P.2d 601 (1971).
24. Id. at 114, 489 P.2d at 603.
25. 141 Misc. 453, 252 N.Y.S. 649 (1931).
26. Rev. Rul. 364, 1974-2 C.B. 321 (revoked by Rev. Rul. 363, 1980-2 C.B. 249),
did not make specific reference to other visa categories, but since this least-restricted of
visa categories was subject to the "legal disability" doctrine, it was safe to conclude that
the other categories, which were more restrictive with regard to the ability of the alien to
intend to reside in the United States, would come under the legal disability doctrine.
27. 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1982).
29. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
30. See infra note 52; Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977); Lok v. INS, 681
F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1932).
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Elkins and the IRS' Response
The Supreme Court in Elkins v. Moreno3' held that the respond-
ents, two dependent children of an employee of a United Nations'
representative, as G-4 visa holders,32 could establish the intent neces-
sary for domicile despite their nonimmigrant visa status. The re-
spondents brought a class action suit to challenge the University of
Maryland's refusal to grant them an in-state tuition preference. The
refusal was based on the university's conclusion that nonimmigrants
are incapable of acquiring the requisite intent to reside permanently
in the state. s The effect of a federal law restricting nonimmigrant
aliens and the viability of the legal disability doctrine were not deter-
mined in the case because the Court concluded that Congress did not
require G-4 aliens to maintain a permanent residence abroad or to
leave the United States at a "date certain."34
The Court noted the nonimmigrant visa classifications as outlined
in section 101(a)(15) of the INA3 5 are "by no means homogeneous
with respect to the terms on which a nonimmigrant enters the
U.S."36 By including restrictions as to intent in the definition of
some nonimmigrant classes "Congress must have meant aliens to be
barred from these classes, if their real purpose in coming to the U.S.
was to immigrate permanently."37 However, where Congress did not
restrict in such a manner, Congress' silence was "deliberate" and
therefore Congress, "while anticipating that permanent immigration
would normally occur through immigrant channels, was willing to
allow non-restricted and nonimmigrant aliens to adopt the U.S. as
their domicile."3 8 The Supreme Court concluded that a G-4 alien
may develop "a subjective intent to stay indefinitely in the U.S....
without violating either the [INA], the Service's regulations, or the
terms of his visa."39
The IRS soon adopted the Elkins rationale, insofar as it applied to
nonimmigrant aliens classified under the G-4 category. In Revenue
Ruling 80-363 the Service determined that because a G-4 alien has
the legal capacity to establish domicile within the United States, he
31. 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
32. 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(G)(iv) (1982).
33. 435 U.S. at 650.
34. Id. at 664.
35. 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(G)(iv) (1982).
36. 435 U.S. at 665.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 666.
39. Id.
or she is not legally disabled.4 0 Revenue Ruling 74-364 was specifi-
cally revoked, with one limitation pursuant to section 7805(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code,41 that the ruling would still apply to aliens
who died prior to December 29, 1980, the date of publication of
Revenue Ruling 80-363.42
Significantly, Revenue Ruling 80-363 makes no reference to any
of the other nonimmigrant visa categories or to the general viability
of the legal disability doctrine. The Elkins Court also declined to
rule specifically on the legal disability doctrine s or with respect to
the other nonimmigrant visa categories. 4 Thus, a legal practitioner
planning the tax estate of alien clients who may currently be, or who
plan to be, in the United States under one nonimmigrant visa cate-
gory or another has little guidance after Revenue Ruling 80-363.
SECTION 212(c), THE Lok CASES AND RAMIFICATIONS
The "lawful domicile" issue is relevant not only to tax planning
but also to the treatment of aliens under section 212(c) of the INA.
Congress enacted section 212(c)45 to assist aliens who are permanent
residents of the United States who would be subject to exclusion
upon re-entering the country after a trip abroad. Since there is no
statute of limitations on grounds of excludability,4 the section aids
these aliens by providing an ameliorative waiver of excludability to
those who have already established themselves as permanent resi-
dents for a period of time. The provision reads:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily pro-
ceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who
are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive
years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without
regard to the provisions of paragraphs (1) through (25) and paragraphs
(30) and (31) of subsection (a).47
In Francis v. INS 48 the Second Circuit held that an alien could
40. Rev. Rul. 363, 1980-2 C.B. 249.
41. I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1976).
42. Rev. Rul. 363, 1980-2 C.B. 249.
43. 435 U.S. at 663.
44. Id. at 664.
45. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163,
187 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1982)).
46. Section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act enunciates 33 classes
of excludable aliens ranging from those who are physically or mentally deficient, have
had prior attacks of insanity, or are economically undesirable, to those who have previ-
ously committed crimes, been involved in narcotics, or are politically undesirable. 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982). Additional undesirable classes of deportable aliens are enunci-
ated in section 241(a) of the INA. Id. at 1251(a).
As indicated, there is no statute of limitations for excludable or deportable offenses.
See Gordon, The Need tb Modernize Our Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1,
5-6, 18-20 (1975).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1982).
48. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
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apply for section 212(c) relief in deportation proceedings as well;49 to
hold otherwise would violate the equal protection clause of the Con-
stitution.50 The Board of Immigration Appeals accepted the ration-
ale of Francis and adopted its interpretation of section 212(c) na-
tionwide.5 1 This set the stage to explore the issue of the precise
extent and applicability of the phrase "a lawful unrelinquished domi-
cile of seven consecutive years. 52
In In re Lok 53 the Board of Immigration Appeals confirmed its
previous interpretation of section 212(c) originally announced in In
re S -," requiring that seven consecutive years of "lawful domicile"
must accrue subsequent to lawful admission for permanent resi-
dence. On appeal, the Second Circuit continued its pioneering role
with regard to interpretation of section 212(c), and held in Lok v.
49. Id. at 273.
50. Id. at 268.
51. See In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (1976), in which the Board adopts and
accepts the Francis rule. There was some doubt as to whether the Francis ruling would
be applicable in the Ninth Circuit until the Ninth Circuit's decision in Tapia-Acuna v.
INS, 640 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981), specifically accepting the Francis doctrine. In In re
Bowe, 17 I. & N. Dec. 488 (1980), the Board refused to apply Francis but certified its
decision to the Attorney General. Prior to the Attorney General's decision, Tapia-Acuna
was decided.
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1982).
53. There were three reported decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals with
regard to In re Lok In Re Lok, 15 I. & N. Dec. 720 (1976); In re Lok, 16 I. & N. Dec.
441 (1978); and In re Lok, I.D. No. 2878 (BIA 1981). The relevant history of Lok's trek
through the American courts began when Lok applied for a waiver under section 212(c)
of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1983). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied
the waiver on May 29, 1975, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed on
July 30, 1976. In re Lok, 15 I. & N. Dec. 720 (1976). On judicial review, the Second
Circuit reversed the BIA decision and remanded to the INS for determination of the
question of whether Lok was a lawful domiciliary though not a permanent resident. Lok
v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977). On June 13, 1978, the INS remanded the record to
the ALJ for initial consideration of the issue framed by the Second Circuit and ordered
the case be certified back to the BIA for review. In re Lok, 16 1. & N. Dec. 441 (1978).
On remand, the ALJ again denied Lok's § 212(c) application. The BIA affirmed in a
brief per curiam opinion dated Nov. 8, 1979, which was not designated for publication.
Lok again filed for judicial review. The Second Circuit entered an order remanding the
case to the BIA to re-examine the ALJ's decision to determine whether it agreed with
the result, and to set forth its reasons. Lok v. INS, No. 80-4076 (2d Cir. 1980). In In re
Lok, I. D. No. 2878 (BIA 1981), the Board adhered to its prior decision that Lok lacked
the required domicile. Lok again filed a petition for review. The Second Circuit denied
the petition in Lok v. INS, 681 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1982). The court held that the fact the
INS and courts tolerated an illegal alien's presence in the country because of the possi-
bility that he might obtain discretionary relief from the Attorney General did not legalize
his intent to remain for purposes of accumulating the necessary seven years of lawful
domicile entitling him to relief from deportation under § 212(c).
54. 5 I. & N. Dec. 116 (1953).
INS55 that the terms "lawful unrelinquished domicile" and "lawfully
admitted for permanent residence" could not be equated, and that
an alien could possess "lawful domicile" in the United States with-
out having been admitted for permanent residence.5" The court fur-
ther held that such domicile, established prior to obtaining residence,
could possibly count toward the seven years required by section
212(c). 57
The Board of Immigration Appeals did not readily accept this in-
terpretation as it had the Second Circuit's Francis decision and de-
clined to apply the decision in cases arising outside the Second Cir-
cuit.58 Soon thereafter, the Ninth Circuit in Castillo - Felix v. INS"
supported the Board's interpretation that the lawful domicile re-
ferred to and intended by Congress in enacting section 212(c) began
subsequent to obtaining permanent residence. Judge Wright, in writ-
ing for the majority, noted that few nonimmigrants could properly
harbor an intent to remain permanently in the United States and
thus maintain a lawful domicile.60 Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit
agreed with the Ninth Circuit and upheld the Board of Immigration
Appeals' interpretation of this section.6 ' Apparently, the rationale of
Lok is not going to gain general acceptance outside the Second Cir-
cuit. This lack of acceptance is not necessarily due to the Board's or
other circuits' belief that it is impossible to establish a "lawful domi-
cile" without permanent residence; rather, it is due to the belief that
the enactment of section 212(c) was not intended to include domicile
time before permanent residence in the count toward seven years. 2
In the Second Circuit, however, Lok v. INS8 3 presents the possi-
bility of obtaining lawful domicile while in nonimmigrant visa status.
On remand the Board found that Lok did not have lawful domicile
during the period of time prior to his obtaining permanent residence.
He "came within the protection of formal Service policy as a conse-
quence of his marriage whereunder he was permitted to remain in
this country. . .until such time as he was eligible to apply for an
55. 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977).
56. Id. at 40.
57. Id.
58. In re Anwo, 16 I. & N. Dec. 293, 296 (1977), affidper curiam, 607 F.2d 435
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
59. 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979).
60. Id. at 464.
61. See Chiravachardhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d 248, 250 (4th Cir. 1981) (agrees with
the Ninth Circuit stating: "We agree with the Ninth Circuit for it is incredible to hold
that Congress would let stand the unvarying and constant reading of its enactment by
the INS for over 26 years if that reading disregarded the Congressional intent.").
62. See generally, Comment, Lawful Domicile Under Section 212(c) of The Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 771 (1980).
63. 681 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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immigrant visa.""4 Citing the definition of domicile quoted in Anwo
v. INS,65 that the individual "intends to reside permanently or indef-
initely in the new location,"0 6 the Board found that the alien's pres-
ence must be lawful "within the meaning of this country's immigra-
tion laws" for domicile to be "lawful." The Board concluded that
Lok's stay was not lawful in this context, despite the fact that the
INS had allowed a "protected" status so that he could complete the
procedure for obtaining permanent legal residence in the United
States.
The Board then cited Elkins v. Moreno,6" concluding that while
Lok was a nonimmigrant crewman he would have been unable to
establish a lawful domicile. The Board stated:
In Elkins v. Moreno, the Supreme Court recognized that the intent to form
a domicile in the United States is incompatible with the terms and condi-
tions of an alien's admission as a nonimmigrant in the case of many of the
nonimmigrant categories set forth in Section 101(a)(15) of the Act, includ-
ing the nonimmigrant crewman classification. If the respondent complied
with the terms of his admission and did not intend to remain in the United
States beyond the fixed period of his temporary stay, then he was not "dom-
iciled" in this country. Conversely, if he did intend to make the United
States his permanent home and domicile, he violated the conditions of his
admission and was not here "lawfully." 69
The Second Circuit affirmed the Board's finding in Lok and also
supported the Board's view that "lawful domicile" was subject to
termination upon a finding of deportability. 0
These decisions and developments leave us with a Second Circuit
which is willing to accept the proposition that one who is not a per-
manent resident may establish a "lawful domicile" for purposes of
section 212(c) and presumably for other purposes as well. Neverthe-
less, there has not been a case in which an alien has succeeded in
establishing lawful domicile outside of section 212(c). We are also
left with the Board of Immigration Appeals' finding which cites El-
kins but appears to be vigorously applying the legal disability doc-
trine. We must now ascertain whether guidelines can be developed to
determine which categories of aliens who are not permanent resi-
dents of the United States, can establish a domicile so as to be
deemed residents of the United States for estate and gift tax
64. In re Lok, I.D. No. 2878, at 12 (BIA 1981).
65. 607 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1982).
66. Id. at 437.
67. Id.
68. 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
69. I.D. No. 2878, at 14 (citations omitted).
70. Lok v. INS, 681 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1982).
purposes.
THE NONIMMIGRANT VISA CATEGORIES - A MECHANICAL
APPLICATION OF Elkins
The starting point in an attempt to extrapolate guidelines for the
nonimmigrant categories is the Elkins Court's analysis and conclu-
sion as to G-4 visa holders. The basis of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Elkins was an analysis of INA section 101(a)(15), 71 which
lists in subsections (A) to (M) various categories of nonimmigrant
visas.7 2 The Court found that "although non-immigrants can gener-
ally be viewed as temporary visitors" the classification is "by no
means homogeneous."17  "By including restrictions on intent in the
definitions of some nonimmigrant classes, Congress must have meant
aliens to be barred from these classes if their real purpose in coming
to the U.S. was to immigrate permanently."7 4 Further, the Court
found nonimmigrants in these "restrictive" classes who sought to es-
tablish domicile were in violation of the status and could and would
be deported. 5
G-4 aliens are admitted for an indefinite period so long as they are
recognized by the Secretary of State to be employees or officers or
immediate family members of such employees or officers of an inter-
national organization."" Since no particular restrictions are found
within section 101 (a)(15)(G)(iv), the category which covers interna-
tional organization representatives, an intent of Congress is mani-
fested to allow nonrestricted aliens such as these "to adopt the U.S.
as their domicile."77
The specially unrestricted nature of the G-4 visa holder is appar-
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1982).
72. At the time of the Elkins decision, 8 U.S.C. § 1ll01(a)(15)(M) (1982) had not
been enacted. The new section is an offshoot of the nonimmigrant-student category (sub-
section (F)) with a somewhat more restrictive regulatory framework. It reads as follows:
[A]n alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of
abandoning who seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the
purpose of pursuing a full course of study at an established vocational or other
recognized nonacademic institution (other than in a language training program)
in the United States particularly designated by him and approved by the Attor-
ney General, after consultation with the Secretary of Education, which institu-
tion shall have agreed to report to the Attorney General the termination of at-
tendance of each nonimmigrant nonacademic student and if any such institution
fails to make reports promptly the approval shall be withdrawn, and (ii) the
alien spouse and minor children of any such alien if accompanying him or fol-
lowing to join him.
For all intents and purposes, the analysis applicable to subsection (F) is equally applica-
ble to this category.
73. 435 U.S. at 665.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 665-66.
76. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(g)(2) (1983).
77. 435 U.S. at 666.
[VOL. 21: 113, 1983] Domicile
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ent from a reading of the applicable regulations. In accordance with
8 C.F.R. section 214.1(c), nonimmigrant aliens defined under
101(a)(15)(G)(iv) are exempt from the normal requirement of non-
immigrants to apply for extension of their stay while in the United
States.7 8 Furthermore, section 214.2(g)(1) states, "the determination
by a consular officer prior to admission and the recognition by the
Secretary of State subsequent to admission shall prima facie estab-
lish the classification of a nonimmigrant defined in Section
101(a)(15)(G) of the Act."'79 A G-4 is not limited as to his initial
period of admission so long as he continues to be recognized by the
Secretary of State.
Few restrictions are placed on a G-4's entry and stay in the
United States. According to one section of the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations, an alien shall be classifiable under the provisions of section
101(a)(15)(G) of the Act if he establishes to the satisfaction of the
consular officer that he is within one of the classes described in that
section and that he seeks to enter, or pass in transit through, the
United States in pursuance of his official duties.8 0 No further restric-
tions as to his entry and stay are mandated by that or any other
regulation.
These special rules indicate a "hands-off" policy which reflects
congressional and executive respect for international convention.
There is a basic recognition that persons coming to the United States
in diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic capacities, although classifiable
as nonimmigrants, require special treatment in consideration of "in-
ternational comity and harmonious foreign relations."' ' It is, there-
fore, understandable that the Supreme Court in Elkins could con-
clude that a G-4, while technically a "nonimmigrant" visa holder,
was sufficiently unrestricted in his ability to stay in the United
States and was capable of forming a subjective intent to stay here
indefinitely without violating either the INA or the Service
regulations.
The Elkins decision has statutory support for the conclusion that
78. 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(c) (1983) states in part: "The nonimmigrant alien defined in
section 101(a)(15)(A)(i) or (ii) or (G)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of the Act is admitted for as
long as such alien continues to be so recognized by the Secretary of State, and is not
required to obtain extension of stay."
79. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(g)(1) (1983).
80. 22 C.F.R. § 41.50(a) (1983). Section 41 of Title 22 of C.F.R. consists of regu-
lations promulgated by the Department of State with regard to nonimmigrant visa
issuance.
81. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, 1 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, §
2.3(H) (rev. ed. 1982).
the G-4 visa holder is not restricted despite his classification as a
"nonimmigrant." Section 102 of the INA82 specifically provides that
designated principal representatives of foreign governments to inter-
national organizations, accredited members of their staff, and mem-
bers of the immediate family of any such persons, are not subject to
the normal immigration restrictions except for those provisions relat-
ing to reasonable requirements of passports and visas as a means of
identification and documentation necessary to establish their qualifi-
cations.83 They are exempt from all other exclusionary grounds pro-
vided by statute.
The G-4 applicant, once recognized by the Secretary of State and
issued a visa by the consular officer, is presumed qualitatively and
quantitatively eligible for that classification, and is admitted to the
United States without restriction as to the duration of his stay.
Moreover, the regulations do not establish any requirement as to the
intent of the individual to depart from the United States, either as to
his subjective intent or as to the duration of his stay."
An excellent student Comment in the University of Chicago Law
Review85 analyzes the conflict in circuits interpreting section 212(c).
In an appendix the Comment draws some conclusions as to which
other nonimmigrants might be capable of establishing a domicile in
the United States. 6 Following the analysis of the Elkins Court, the
commentator concludes that foreign government officials, their fami-
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1102 (1982).
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1102 (1982) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, for so long as they continue in the
nonimmigrant classes enumerated in this section, the provisions of this chapter
relating to ineligibility to receive visas and the exclusion or deportation of aliens
shall not be construed to apply to nonimmigrants -
(1) within the class described in paragraph (15)(A)(i) of section 1101(a) of
this title, except those provisions relating to reasonable requirements of pass-
ports and visas as a means of identification and documentation necessary to es-
tablish their qualifications under such paragraph (15)(A)(i), and, under such
rules and regulations as the President may deem to be necessary, the provisions
of paragraph (27) of section 82(a) of this title;
(2) within the class described in paragraph (15)(G)(i) of section 1101(a) of
this title, except those provisions relating to reasonable requirements of pass-
ports and visas as a means of identification and documentaion [sic] necessary to
establish their qualifications under such paragraph (15)(G)(i) and the provisions
of paragraph (27) of section 82(a) of this title; and
(3) within the classes described in paragraphs (15)(A)(ii), (15)(G)(ii),
(15)(G)(iii), or (15)(G)(iv) of section 1101(a) of this title, except those provi-
sions relating to reasonable requirements of passports and visas as a means of
identification and documentation necessary to establish their qualifications
under such paragraphs, and the provisions of paragraphs (27) and (29) of sec-
tion 82(a) of this title.
84. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a), (c) (1983); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(a) (1983); 22
C.F.R. §§ 41.40-.41 (1983).
85. See Comment, supra note 62.
86. Id. at 797-802.
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lies and their retinues (A-i, A-2, and A-3 nonimmigrants),8 7 aliens
who qualify to pass in transit to and from the United Nations Head-
quarters District (C-2 nonimmigrants) 88 and various representatives
of NATO member states and their families and retinues (NATO-1
through NATO-5 and NATO-7 nonimmigrants),89 would clearly be
able to establish domicile along with the G visa holders referred to in
the Elkins decision. These classes are unrestricted as to length of
stay in the United States and as to the maintenance of a foreign
residence.9"
Reasoning from the Elkins rationale, certain groups must clearly
be precluded from seeking domicile in the United States given the
severe restrictions placed upon their intended stay.91 Thus, tempo-
rary visitors for business or pleasure (B-1 and B-2 visa holders),92
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)(i), (ii), (iii) (1982) provides:
(A)(i) an ambassador, public minister, or career diplomatic or consular of-
ficer who has been accredited by a foreign government recognized de jure by the
United States and who is accepted by the President or by the Secretary of State
and the members of the alien's immediate family;(ii) upon a basis of reciprocity, other officials and employees who have
been accredited by a foreign government recognized de jure by the United
States, who are accepted by the Secretary of State, and the members of their
immediate families; and
(iii) upon a basis of reciprocity, attendants, servants, personal employees,
and members* of their immediate families of the officials and employees who
have a nonimmigrant status under (i) and (ii) above ....
88. 8 U.S.C. § l1l01(a)(15)(C) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
.. or an alien who qualifies as a person entitled to pass in transit to and from the
United Nations Headquarters District and foreign countries, under the provisions of
paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) of section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement with the
United Nations ...."
89. 22 C.F.R. § 41.70 (1983) provides in part:
(A)(1) An alien shall be classifiable under the symbol NATO-1, NATO-2,
NATO-3, NATO-4, or NATO-5 ... if he establishes to the satisfaction of the
consular officer that he is seeking admission to the United States under the ap-
plicable provision of the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, National Representatives and International Staff, or that he is a
member of the immediate family of an alien classified under the symbol NATO-
1, NATO-2, NATO-3, NATO-4, or NATO-5.
(c) "Analien attendant, servant, or personal employee of an alien classified under
the symbol NATO-1, NATO-2, NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6,
and the members of the immediate family of such attendant, servant, or per-
sonal employee, shall be classifiable under the symbol NATO-7.
90. See supra notes 87-89.
91. See Comment, supra note 62, at 799.
92. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)(B) (1982) provides:
[Ain alien (other than one coming for the purpose of study or of performing
skilled and unskilled labor or as a representative of foreign press, radio, film, or
other foreign information media coming to engage in such vocation) having a
students (F and M visa holders),93 and exchange visitors (J visa
holders), 94 would clearly be incapable of establishing residence.
The Chicago Law Review Comment delineates a third category
consisting of treaty traders (E visa holders),95 foreign media repre-
sentatives (I visa holders), 98 intra-company transferees (L visa hold-
ers), 97 and fiances (K visa holders).9 8 Nonimmigrants in this cate-
gory are admitted only for a temporary stay, but are not required to
residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning and who
is visiting the United States for temporary business or temporarily for pleasure
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(15)(F) (1982) provides:
[A]n alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of
abandoning, who is a bona fide student qualified to pursue a full course of study
and who seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose
of pursuing such a course of study at an established college, university, semi-
nary, conservatory, academic high school, elementary school or other academic
institution or in a language training program in the United States, particularly
designated by him and approved by the Attorney General after consultation
with the Secretary of Education, which institution or place of study shall have
agreed to report to the Attorney General the termination of attendance of each
nonimmigrant student, and if any such institution of learning or place of study
fails to make reports promptly the approval shall be withdrawn ....
The text of 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(15)(M) (1982) is reproduced supra, note 72.
94. 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(J) (1982) provides:
[A]n alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of
abandoning, who is a bona fide student, scholar, trainee, teacher, professor, re-
search assistant, specialist, or leader in a field of specialized knowledge or skill,
or other person of similar description, who is coming temporarily to the United
States as a participant in a program designated by the Secretary of State, for
the purpose of teaching, instructing or lecturing, studying, observing, conducting
research, consulting, demonstrating special skills, or receiving training and who,
if he is coming to the United States to participate in a program under which he
will receive graduate medical education or training, also meets the requirements
of section 2120) of this title, and the alien spouse and minor children of any
such alien if accompanying him or following to join him ....
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(15)(E) (1982). This code section is reproduced infra at
text accompanying note 104.
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(15)(I) (1982) provides:
[U]pon a basis of reciprocity, an alien who is a bona fide representative of for-
eign press, radio, film, or other foreign information media, who seeks to enter
the United States solely to engage in such vocation and the spouse and children
of such a representative if accompanying or following to join him .
97. Subsection (L) of § 1101(a)(15) (1982) provides:
[A]n alien who, immediately preceding the time of his application for admission
into the United States, has been employed continuously for one year by a firm
or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who
seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his
services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity
that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge, and the alien
spouse and minor children of any such alien if accompanying him or following
to join him ...
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K) (1982) provides:
[A]n alien who is a fiancee or fiance of a citizen of the United States and who
seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid marriage with the
petitioner within ninety days after entry, and the minor children of such fiancee
or fiance accompanying him or following to join him . . ..
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intend to remain temporarily.
Thus, by mechanically applying and extrapolating from the
standard and Elkins, three groups of nonimmigrant visa categories
emerge. The first group, those clearly able to establish a domicile,
consists of people in visa categories generally treated specially be-
cause of international diplomatic concerns.9 We then have a second
group that is clearly unable to establish domicile, as inferred from
Elkins, because of specific restrictions as to their intent to remain in
this country and to the length of their stay.100 Finally, the hybrid
third group appears to have elements of both the others.
Although the Comment's author appears to believe the visa cate-
gories in this so-called "hybrid" group have domiciliary capabili-
ties,101 it is by no means certain. Analysis of the treaty-trader and
investor categories (E-1 and E-2 visa holders) which are similar to
the G and other diplomatic or quasi-diplomatic nonimmigrant visa
classifications demonstrate this uncertainty. 0 2
Treaty Investors and Traders
Section 101(a)(15) provides in relevant part:
The term "immigrant" means every alien except an alien. . . within one of
the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens-
(E) an alien entitled to enter the United States under and in pursuance of
the provisions of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United
States and the foreign state of which he is a national. .. (i) solely to carry
on substantial trade, principally between the United States and the foreign
state of which he is a national; or (ii) solely to develop and direct the opera-
tions of an enterprise in which he has invested, or of an enterprise in which
99. Comment, supra note 62, at 798.
100. Id. at 800.
101. Id. at 801.
102. These visa categories are made expressly applicable only to individuals who
are citizens of countries having with the United States a treaty of commerce and trade
which has such a visa provision. See infra text accompanying note 103. At the present
time, the following countries have E-1 treaties with the United States:
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ja-
pan, Korea, Latvia, Liberia, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Paki-
stan, Paraguay, The Philippines, Spain, Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Switzerland,
Thailand, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom and Great Britain, North Ireland, Vietnam,
Yugoslavia. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, pt. 2, § 41.40
(Exhibit 1)(1983). The above countries, with the exception of Bolivia, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Latvia, Greece, Ireland, Israel and Turkey have E-2 treaties with the United
States. Id. at § 41.41 (Exhibit 1).
he is actively in the process of investing, a substantial amount of capital
103
Such treaty investor or trader is classifiable as a nonimmigrant.
There is no specific restriction within the statute requiring that the
individual have a residence in a foreign country which he has no
intention of abandoning, such as is applicable to visitors for pleasure,
students, and temporary workers. However, there is also no "hands-
off" policy with regard to E visa holders as previously described with
regard to the G-4 and similar categories.""
Detailed immigration regulations require that an alien establish
that he is a nonimmigrant treaty investor or trader in accordance
with the provisions of the INA and that "he intends to depart from
the United States upon termination of his status."10 5 Moreover, the
regulations specifically limit the initial period of admission of an
alien under the E visa category to one year.10 6 Such a nonimmigrant
"may" be granted extensions of his temporary stay in increments of
"not more than one year.' 07
In In re Udagawa,08 the Board of Immigration Appeals accepted
the State Department's regulatory conditions as a reasonable and
appropriate construction of the INA. The Board confirmed that a
nonimmigrant treaty investor must establish that "he intends to de-
part from the United States upon the termination of his status."'" 9
There are additional restrictions on the E visa holder not generally
found with regard to other nonimmigrant visa categories, and cer-
tainly not applicable to G-4 visa holders. The regulations provide the
one year limitation described above, and in addition, provide a spe-
cial requirement that Form 1-539 (the extension application) be sub-
mitted, as well as a properly executed Form 1-126 (the Annual Re-
port of Treaty Trader)." 0
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(15)(E) (1982).
104. See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
105. 22 C.F.R. § 41.41 (1983) (emphasis added).
106. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(e) (1983).
107. Id.
108. 14 1. & N. Dec. 578 (1974).
109. Id. at 579.
110. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(e) (1983) provides:
A trader or investor and his spouse or child who accompanied or followed to join
him, who acquired nonimmigrant status on or after December 24, 1952, under
section 101(a)(15)(E)(i) or (ii) of the Act shall apply for an extension of the
period of temporary admission on Form 1-539, and such trader or investor shall
submit together therewith Form 1-126, properly executed by him, with such ad-
ditional documents as are required by that form.
It is noteworthy that provision is made with regard to the families of G-4 visa holders for
the granting of employment authorization, whereas no such provision is made for the
families of Treaty Investors. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(g)(2) (1983) provides:
(2) Employment. The spouse, unmarried dependent son, or unmarried depen-
dent daughter habitually residing with an officer or employee of an international
organization, classified as a G-4 nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(G)(iv)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, may be granted permission to accept or
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The legislative history of the G and E visas serves to highlight the
contrast between these two visa categories. Elkins has demonstrated
that the liberal and unrestricted regulations relating to G-4 visa
holders manifest an intent by Congress not to place a restriction on
such a nonimmigrant's intent. Legislative history indicates this is
clearly not the case with regard to the treaty investor or trader
categories.
Prior to 1924, treaty merchants who came to the United States
were admitted for permanent residence and were allowed full resi-
dence status if they continued to reside in this country, including the
right of re-entry after a temporary absence and a right to apply for
continue employment in the United States if an application to do so has first
been favorably recommended by an authorized representative of the Department
of State and approved by the District Director of this Service as indicated
below.
There is some dispute as to whether dependents of treaty traders may in fact be em-
ployed in the United States. Inconsistent instructions have been issued by the Acting
Commissioner of the Immigration Service and a Consular Letter originating from
London, England.
In a letter dated April 23, 1980, then Acting Associate Commissioner of Examina-
tions, Andrew J. Carmichael, Jr. stated:
There is no provision in either law or regulation for authorizing employment for
the dependents of "E" nonimmigrants while they hold that nonimmigrant classi-
fication. The Service, however, has chosen not to proceed against those who do
work while the principal "E" nonimmigrant is maintaining status. This does not
mean that they have been relieved of the necessity of complying with all of the
provisions of section 245 of- the Immigration and Nationality Act should they
later apply for adjustment of status. Accordingly, the Service will continue to
find that employment by the dependent of an "E" nonimmigrant is "unauthor-
ized" and a bar to adjustment of status under section 245(c)(2) of the Act.
Letter of Acting Associate Commissioner, as summarized in 58 Interpreter Releases 420-
421 (1981).
The American Embassy in London, England, has issued the following instructions:
The spouse and children (under 21) of a treaty trader will need visas as well.
They may work in the United States, providing they hold visas as the spouse/
children of a treaty trader. A separate visa application must be completed for
each person. ...
Letter from American Embassy, American Consul, London, England, (April 1981).
The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service indicate as follows:
While the Service is not in a position to authorize the nonimmigrant E spouse
and children of a treaty trader or treaty investor to accept employment, they
shall not be deemed to have violated status if they do so; and so long as the
principal E nonimmigrant is maintaining status, no action shall be taken to re-
quire their departure.
U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Operations In-
structions, Regulations and Interpretations 214.2e, reprinted in C. GORDON & H. Ro-
SENFIELD, supra note 81, at 23-364.1.
The inconsistencies in the above instructions and correspondences have yet to be
resolved.
citizenship.""' These treaty rights were equally applicable to family
members. 1 2
The Immigration Act of 1924 modified treaty rights and specifi-
cally limited treaty aliens to nonimmigrant status.113 The Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, which continued nonimmigrant
status for treaty traders, added the new class of treaty investors. The
committee reports specify that the latter dispensation "is intended to
provide for the temporary admission of such aliens who will be en-
gaged in developing or directing the operations of a real operating
enterprise and not a fictitious paper operation.""1 "
Accordingly, Elkins appears to be distinguishable. Unlike the G-4,
the E-1 or E-2 visa holder cannot develop subjective intent to stay
indefinitely in the United States without violating the INA or the
Service regulations. Thus, even if the visa holder formed the intent
to remain in the United States indefinitely, he could be found not to
have the legal capacity to establish domicile within the United States
despite the Elkins ruling; a fortiori, the same is true with regard to
the H, I, and L visa categories which have more restrictions gener-
ally than the E visa holder classification. 5 Thus, a strong argument
could be made for the proposition that there are really only two cate-
gories: Group I, consisting of the diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic
classifications which could establish a "domicile" regardless of the
legal disability doctrine, and Group II, all other nonimmigrant visa
categories.
The conclusions of the foregoing analysis, however, are not partic-
ularly satisfying. The Elkins Court specifically declined to determine
whether the legal disability doctrine has any viability.""' Within the
context of the estate and gift tax, it might be appropriate to reject
the legal fiction of the "legal disability" doctrine and apply a subjec-
tive test, or to develop specific regulatory guidelines with regard to
establishing domicile in the United States.1
111. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 81, at § 2.11(a)(1).
112. See Lowe v. United States, 230 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1956).
113. Ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153. See also Lowe v. United States, 230 F.2d 664 (9th
Cir. 1956).
114. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 20; H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 44, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1653.
115. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H), (I), (L) (1982); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)
(1982).
116. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 663 (1978).
117. With reference to establishing "residence" for purposes of the income tax, a
case-by-case determination must be made. The income tax regulations provide that an
alien is a resident if he is actually in the United States and is not a mere transient.
Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1983). Transience is determined with reference to intentions
concerning duration and nature of stay. Id.
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AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL-A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE
LEGAL DISABILITY DOCTRINE
Revenue Ruling 74-364, in stating the legal disability doctrine and
its applicability to the estate tax, indicates that the acceptance by
the decedent of the prescribed terms for his admission and stay in
the United States as required by federal law and regulations "cre-
ated a legal disability that rendered him incapable of forming the
intention necessary for establishment of a domicile here."1 ', In other
words, one cannot be here legally as a nonimmigrant (at least in
certain categories) 1 9 if one has established a domicile in the United
States.
However, as stated in Seren v. Douglas,20 "disability could, as a
matter of fact and law, have dissolved upon the expiration of his
student visa. At such time he could abandon his legal intent to re-
turn to his homeland and seek status as a permanent resident of the
United States. 1 21 Why can he not, in violation of his status, choose
to abandon such intent earlier? He can in fact, and that is the weak-
ness of the disability doctrine.
The Board of Immigration Appeals recognized this anomaly when
it analyzed Elkins v. Moreno in In re Lok. The Board stated:
If the respondent complied with the terms of his admission and did not
intend to remain in the United States beyond the fixed period of his tempo-
rary stay, then he was not "domiciled" in this country. Conversely, if he did
intend to make the United States as his permanent home and domicile, he
violated the conditions of his admission and was not here "lawfully."1 2
We cannot simply ignore the alien's "subjective intent" and say that
he has not established a domicile. On the contrary, his subjective
intent should be taken into account which, if it were to come to the
attention of an immigration official, should result in the cancellation
of his temporary visa status.1 23 In fact, any extrapolation from the
118. Rev. Rul. 364, 1974-2, C.B. 321.
119. Of course, the ruling is only referring specifically to G-4 visa category hold-
ers. Id.
120. 30 Colo. App. 110, 489 P.2d 601 (1971).
121. Id. at 114-15, 489 P.2d at 603.
122. In re Lok, I.D. No. 2878, at 14 (1981).
123. As a matter of administrative practice, it is an accepted line of inquiry to
ascertain from an applicant for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982), when he decided to remain in the
United States permanently. Should such intent predate the application for adjustment of
status by any substantial period of time, the adjudicating officer is likely to conclude that
the individual was in violation of status, particularly if there were several entries into the
United States after such intent was fixed using the nonimmigrant visa.
G-4 visa holder's so-called ability to legally and "lawfully" establish
a domicile appears to be misguided and fails to consider the distin-
guishing factor which accounts for this difference-the unique quasi-
diplomatic character of the G-4.124
An almost simplistic examination of the INA shows that all en-
trants to the United States are presumed to be immigrants125 and
will not be admitted as nonimmigrants unless they can establish to
the satisfaction of the Secretary of Statd that they fit into one of the
categories enunciated in section 101(a)(15).212 This burden remains
with the alien each time he departs from the United States and seeks
to re-enter as a nonimmigrant. 27
It is a clear and long-standing rule of administrative law that a
nonimmigrant alien visa holder who intends to remain in the United
States permanently (and establish a domicile here) is ineligible or
will be deemed ineligible for extensions of stay or new visas in that
category.128 The very filing of an application for "alien labor certifi-
124. See supra text accompanying notes 70-86.
125. Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides:
Every alien shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes to the
satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time of application for visa, and the
immigration officers, at the time of application for admission, that he is entitled
to a nonimmigrant status under section 101(a)(15).
8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (1982).
126, Id.
127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a) (1982).
128. Both the State Department and the Department of Justice have specifically
taken the position in writing that while the filing of a labor certification or a preference
petition or otherwise evincing an interest in becoming a permanent resident is not an
absolute bar to qualifying for a nonimmigrant visa, or for such nonimmigrant visa status,
it does, at the very least, raise a valid area of inquiry.
The State Department so noted in an unclassified airgram, Number A-0444, February
12, 1979, which states as follows:
4. Intending Immigrants:
The issue of eligibility of NIV applicants who have registered for immigrant
visas was discussed. There are many circumstances where an NIV registrant has
a legitimate purpose for making a visit to the United States. Post a reminder
that NIV registration is not ipso facto a ground for ineligibility. Each case must
be judged in the light of the regulations and the circumstances. However, the
consular officer must be assured that the applicant will depart from the United
States after the purpose of the visit has been accomplished.
The State Department reiterated this policy in a cable to consular posts which was
republished in U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 20 Visa Office Bulletin
Vol. 5. In referring to (E) visa holders, the cable states:
[A]lthough unlike other nonimmigrants the Treaty Investor or Trader need not
be coming "temporarily to the United States," but must have a "residence in a
foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning . . ." the Consuls are
still advised that the applicant must express "an unequivocal intent" to return to
his country when his E-2 visa status ends.
See also, 56 Interpreter Releases 268 (1979); 59 Interpreter Releases 753 (1982).
In a letter to counsel dated August 27, 1981, Andrew J. Carmichael Jr., Associate
Commissioner, Examinations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, referring
specifically to "H" or "L" nonimmigrants who are beneficiaries of labor certifications or
preference petitions, indicates that although the filing of such petitions does not automat-
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cation" with the Department of Labor or the filing of a preliminary
petition with the INS in and of itself may seriously jeopardize the
legal status of a nonimmigrant in the United States.129
Thus, the Board of Immigration Appeals has not yet ruled that
any nonimmigrant visa holder could have "lawful" domicile in the
United States. It is not likely to extend Elkins beyond the G-4 or
other such quasi-diplomatic visa categories. In the estate and gift tax
area, the IRS must recognize that the group of potential domiciliar-
ies created in Elkins is limited. To remain consistent, the IRS must
also recognize that undocumented aliens who are truly domiciliaries
of the United States in fact, cannot be so deemed because of the
legal disability doctrine. As the Board of Immigration Appeals
pointed out in Lok, an alien does not have lawful domicile even when
the government specifically permits him to remain in the United
States under voluntary departure status so that he might complete
an application leading ultimately to the granting of permanent resi-
dence in this country. 30
It would seem more appropriate for the IRS to take the position,
as it does with residents in the context of the income tax,' 3' that visa
ically preclude nonimmigrant status,
the foregoing interpretation does not mean that all, or even most 'H' or 'L' non-
immigrants who are beneficiaries of labor certifications or preference petitions
can qualify for extensions of stay. Indeed, the filing of a visa petition or labor
certification request does raise a valid area of inquiry which must be pursued
..Service policy remains that an extension of stay application (Forms 1-539
or I-129B) must be adjudicated on the merits of each case and that the filing of
a labor certification request or of an occupational preference petition does not
automatically preclude favorable action on the application.
129. See supra note 128.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66. The INS has a policy of allowing
certain undocumented aliens (illegal aliens) to remain in the United States by continuing
to extend the period of time within which they must voluntarily depart from the United
States where a preference petition has been approved and an application for an immi-
grant visa is being pursued at an American Embassy. Thus, the INS allows the individ-
ual to remain in this "non-status" until he can conveniently leave the United States and
immediately return as a permanent resident. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS AND INTER-
PRETATIONS 242.5, 242.10 (1983).
131. An alien, by reason of his alienage, is presumed to be a nonresident alien for
tax purposes, in accordance with Treas. Reg. 1.871-4(b) (1983). On the other hand, an
alien in the United States for one year or more is presumed to be a resident for federal
income tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 611, 1969-2 C.B. 150. See, e.g., Escobar v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 68 T.C. 304 (1977). See generally Grunblatt, U.S. Taxation of For-
eign Persons, 37TH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYER'S As-
SOCIATION 216 (1983). At the present time, visa status does not determine residence for
income tax purposes, so a case-by-case determination must be made. On June 30, 1983,
H.R. 3475 was introduced in the United States Congress containing a provision which,
status is only a factor to be considered in determining whether domi-
cile has been established. This position has also been seen in other
contexts, particularly in state courts, where federal immigration sta-
tus has not been deemed to be particularly relevant or significant to
the issue of domicile.
In Bustamante v. Bustamante,132 the Supreme Court of Utah
held that a nonimmigrant alien could be an "actual and bona fide
resident" 133 of the state for purposes of its divorce statute, even
though her status as a nonimmigrant was unlawful. The court con-
cluded that issues of legality with regard to federal immigration sta-
tus are not determinative with regard to establishing "domicile in a
state for divorce purposes. 1 34 The court stated that "a visa is a doc-
ument of entry required of aliens by the United States government
and is a matter under control of the government. It has little rele-
vance to the question of domicile. '1 35
The Court of Appeals of Oregon also rejected the legal disability
doctrine with regard to divorce jurisdiction. It stated:
A rule such as husband suggests would require the application of a type of
legal fiction for which we see no necessity. Wife lived in this state for nearly
four years. Her visa has apparently been expired for most of that time. She
has applied for a change of status so that she may remain in this country
permanently. Whatever the disposition of that application, it appears from
the record that she presently intends to remain in this state indefinitely.'
Similarly, the California Court of Appeal criticized a State Board
of Control regulation which defined a "resident of California" in
terms of "domicile. 11 37 The court rejected the assumption that the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws mandates a finding that
an illegal alien cannot establish domicile:
The Board argues, though, that under the Restatement Second of Conflict
of Laws Section 15(1), a domicile of choice may be acquired only by a
person who is legally capable of changing his or her domicile and that
neither Cabral or Vasquez were or are legally capable of changing their
respective domiciles from Mexico to California because of their illegal en-
tries into the United States. The Restatement, though, places no such limi-
for the first time, defines a resident and nonresident alien for United States income tax
purposes. The proposed legislation defines an alien as a resident if such individual meets
any of the following requirements: (i) the individual is a lawful permanent resident of the
United States (green card status); (ii) the individual has an application for an immigrant
visa (green card) pending at any time during the calendar year and was present in the
United States for at least sixty (60) days during such calendar year; or (iii) the individ-
ual meets the "substantial presence test." H.R. 3475, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983).
132. 645 P.2d 40 (Utah 1982).
133. id. at 41.
134. Id. at 42.
135. Id.
136. In re Marriage of Pirouzkar, 51 Or. App. 519, 626 P.2d 380, 384 (1981)(footnote omitted).
137. Cabral v. State Board of Control, 169 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 169 Cal. Rptr. 604(1981).
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tation on the legal capacity of any person to change his or her domicile.13
The doctrine which prevailed before Elkins and Revenue Ruling
80-348, assumed that because of the legal disability doctrine a non-
immigrant alien could not establish a domicile in the United States,
was perhaps overly simplistic. Indeed, Elki.s has carved out at least
one exception to that rule 39 and perhaps is hinting that the whole
doctrine has little utility.1
40
CONCLUSION
Those who do tax planning for aliens are still not in a position to
advise their clients whether they have or will establish a "domicile"
in the United States based upon the nonimmigrant visas their clients
may hold. Accordingly, the problem of how to resolve the resultant
confusion still exists.
One approach is to adopt the view14 1 that the notion of legal disa-
bility definitely applies to some nonimmigrant visa categories, defi-
nitely does not apply to others, and may have applicability to several
visa categories in the gray area. Alternatively, the Internal Revenue
Service can remedy this situation by promulgating clarifying regula-
tions. These regulations should set forth the presumptive ability of
aliens in each of the various nonimmigrant visa statuses to establish
a domicile in the the United States for gift and estate tax purposes.
They should also set forth the relevant considerations and relative
weight to be accorded to various factual circumstances which might
affect an alien's domicile. Following the pattern of currently pro-
posed legislation142 clarifying the United States income tax liability
of aliens, such regulations could be useful guides to tax experts ad-
vising alien clients. Such regulations should have prospective effect
only, so as not to prejudice aliens who have already taken action
based upon a reading of existing law.
In any such regulatory system the L (intra-company transferee)
and E (treaty trader or investor) categories, presently in the gray
area, should be precluded from establishing domicile in the United
States in the absence of a clear intention to do so. Holders of visas in
these categories are aliens who, unlike the A (diplomatic) and G
(semi-diplomatic or international organization) visa holders who the
138. Id. at 1016, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
139. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
140. Id. at 648.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 85-100.
142. See supra note 131.
United States is obliged to accept under principles of international
law, are aliens purposely encouraged to come to the United States in
international trade. Treaty aliens, who are here pursuant to treaties
approved by the United States Senate, come to conduct substantial
trade or to direct the operations of businesses in which they have
substantial investments. 143 Intra-company transferees are encouraged
to come to direct the operations of new or existing American affili-
ates or subsidiaries of foreign businesses. 44 To hold that such aliens
have established a domicile here, in the absence of a clear intention
to do so, would be counter-productive to our efforts to encourage for-
eign businesses and aliens of substance to do business in this country.
A similar policy has encouraged foreign press representatives, hold-
ers of I visa status,1 45 to spend substantial periods of time in this
country in order to promote United States' interests in the foreign
media. The Internal Revenue Service should take note of the strong
policy considerations underlying each of the various nonimmigrant
visa statuses and find an appropriate method to furnish guidance to
aliens on matters of United States tax domicile.
143. See supra text accompanying note 103.
144. See supra note 98.
145. See supra note 96.
